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NASA faked the first moon landing.[1] 
The US government orchestrated the attacks 
on 9/11.[2] 
A cabal of Satan-worshiping pedophiles 
running a global child sex-trafficking ring is 
plotting against Donald Trump, who is battling 
them. [3] 
Each of these claims have been denounced as a 
“conspiracy theory.”[4] But what are conspiracy 
theories? Should we ever accept one? If so, when? 
This essay offers initial answers to these questions.[5] 
1. Defining Conspiracy Theories 
First, what’s a conspiracy? 
Conspiracies are actions or plans undertaken by a 
small group of individuals working in secret to 
achieve shared goals. These goals need not be 
sinister: the African National Congress conspired for 
decades to bring down the apartheid regime in South 
Africa—a noble aspiration. 
Second, what’s a theory? 
In general, theories try to explain some set of 
(alleged) facts or events, usually by identifying their 
causes. The first two examples above (the moon 
landing coverage and the 9/11 attacks) attempt to 
explain these events by making claims about what 
caused them.[6] 
Putting these together yields this definition: 
a conspiracy theory is an explanation of some alleged 
fact or event in terms of the actions undertaken by a 
small group of individuals working in secret.[7] 
2. Common Misunderstandings 
Conspiracy theories are often assumed to be 
inherently irrational or false by definition.[8] But since 
some accusations of conspiracy have merit, a 
definition should not assume that conspiracy 
theories must be problematic.[9] Our proposed 
definition reflects this and corrects this common 
misunderstanding. 
Indeed, most people accept some conspiracy 
theories—e.g., Watergate or the claim that the 9/11 
attacks were perpetrated by al-Qaeda. In fact, if 
you’ve told someone about a recent surprise party 
you attended, then you’ve explained an event by 
reference to a small group of individuals working in 
secret, and so you’ve offered a conspiracy theory! 
Conspiracy theories need not contradict any “official 
story” or explanation of events that most people 
accept.[10] If they did, then a conspiracy theory would 
cease to be one, e.g., when official sources give 
conflicting stories, when there simply is no official 
account, or when the conspiracy theory is adopted by 
officials.[11] 
3. Evaluating Conspiracy Theories 
So conspiracy theories are sometimes true; they 
are sometimes reasonable to accept. But when?[12] 
Conspiracy theories claim the existence of a 
conspiracy. Conspirators disclosing or “leaking” 
information about their activities would be good 
evidence for a conspiracy theory. But few people 
admit to being directly involved in conspiracies, so 
conspiracy theories typically lack this support.[13] 
Some claim that successful conspiracies won’t have 
leaks.[14] But the absence of such 
evidence does undermine a theory when efforts to 
find it fail. And the more ambitious a conspiracy, the 
less likely its activities are to remain secret. It is hard 
to get people to work together on long-term, complex 
projects—much less in secret. 
Conspiracy theories often claim to explain data that 
contradicts or is left out by the official story. But they 
rarely end up explaining more data than their rivals, 
since they tend to have their own “errant data” that 
they cannot accommodate:[15] e.g., conspiracy 
theories about 9/11 usually cannot explain why there 
is a video of Osama Bin Laden claiming responsibility 
for the attacks.[16] So conspiracy theories often do not 
explain more data.[17] 
Since they appeal to one cause (i.e., the conspiracy’s 
goal) rather than to many, conspiracy theories may 
seem simpler than their rivals—e.g., when an 
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international free-trade agreement is explained by 
leaders’ secret desire for world government, rather 
than by many competing national interests. 
However, conspiracy theories often add causes—
conspiratorial ones—to explanations offered by their 
non-conspiratorial rivals: e.g., the “Pizzagate” 
conspiracy theory[18] claimed that kids were at a 
pizza shop because of a child-trafficking ring’s 
activities. This assumes that kids were there for 
pizza and a malicious cartel’s actions. So this 
conspiracy theory, like many others, is not simpler.[19] 
Some see the problems not in conspiracy theories 
themselves but with their advocates who rarely make 
novel predictions and tend to accommodate failed 
predictions by making ad hoc changes to their theory 
rather than by abandoning it.[20] Some inflate the 
scope of a conspiracy to save their theory:[21] e.g., 
when a newspaper’s articles contradict a conspiracy 
theory, they conclude that the newspaper’s staff is in 
on the conspiracy too.[22] 
Some critics charge conspiracy theorists with failing 
to properly defer to experts, resulting in theories that 
contradict expert testimony.[23] Conspiracy theorists 
often justify their mistrust by claiming that experts 
are themselves part of the conspiracy or have been 
duped by it.[24] But this is yet another way to inflate 
the scope of a conspiracy, which makes its existence 
less likely. 
Other critics claim that distrust of experts is a 
harmful effect, rather than a cause, of conspiracy 
theorizing. Since much of what we know comes from 
experts[25] and public institutions (e.g., the 
government, the press, academia, and professional 
organizations), accepting conspiracy theories 
deprives us of vital sources of knowledge.[26] Of 
course, only those theories that posit conspiracies 
with pervasive influence on our public institutions 
require such widespread skepticism.[27] 
So, while conspiracy theories 
aren’t inherently irrational or false, few offer better 
explanations than their rivals. 
4. Why Conspiracy Theories? 
Many people, nonetheless, find conspiracy theories 
appealing. By urging us to “follow the 
breadcrumbs”[28] and to “think for 
ourselves,”[29] these theories promise to make a 
complicated world intelligible to those without 
specialized training or expert knowledge. By claiming 
that a small group of evildoers are behind tragic 
events, they offer simple solutions to complex 
problems.[30] 
Whatever their appeal, we should approach 
conspiracy theories the way we would any theory—
i.e., by comparing their merits to their rivals’. Far-
reaching conspiracies are rarely successful, so the 
more plausible conspiracy theories might be those 
that try to explain a smaller range of events by 
appealing to a conspiracy with limited goals.[31] These 
theories also shouldn’t challenge the judgment of 
experts without providing adequate evidence of their 
unreliability. 
Will any of today’s influential conspiracy theories 
meet these demands? Probably not.[32] 
Notes 
[1] See Exposed: Apollo 11 Moon Landing Conspiracy 
Theories, (2019, June 28). Some versions of this 
theory even claim that the famed director Stanley 
Kubrick helped to film the fake moon landing and 
that his film The Shining is a cryptic “confession” 
(Lamb, 2010). 
[2] There are various versions of this theory. For a 
consideration of some, see Was 9/11 an Inside 
Job? (2016, September 8). 
[3] The QAnon conspiracy theory is arguably among 
the most influential conspiracy theories in the history 
of US politics. But it is by no means the first. Aside 
from the well-supported theories regarding the 
Watergate Hotel break-in (Perlstein, 2020) and the 
Iran-Contra-Affair (“The Iran-Contra Affair,” 2020), a 
version of the Illuminati conspiracy theory played an 
important role in early American politics (Fea, 2020). 
For an overview of the QAnon theory, See What is 
QAnon? How the Conspiracy Theory Gained Traction in 
the 2020 Campaign, (2020, August 12). 
[4] While such claims may have increased with the 
rise of social media, the term “conspiracy theory” has 
been with us for some time. The term seems to have 
first appeared in a New York Times article in 1863 
(Caulfield, 2018). 
[5] For a brief overview of the philosophical thinking 
about conspiracy theories, see Pauly (retrieved 
2020). For more extensive treatments, see Dentith 
(2014), Coady (2006) and Uscinski (2018). The first 
philosopher to address conspiracy theories explicitly 
and at length was Karl Popper (1966; 1972). 
[6] Muirhead and Rosenblum (2019) claim that the 
recent wave of conspiracy theories, what they call 
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the new conspiracism, are not really “theories” at all, 
since they don’t offer explanations or claims about 
causes: they are mere insinuations of a conspiracy. 
Clarke (2002; 2007) also contends that some 
conspiracy theories are not sufficiently developed to 
count as theories. 
[7] This is similar to the definition proposed by 
Dentith (2014; 2018a) and Keeley (1999). The 
definition has some open-ended elements. 
How small must a group be to count as a conspiracy? 
Qualifying as a member of a conspiracy often 
depends on how much someone knows about the 
group’s plans and what level of influence they have 
over them. 
What counts as working in secret? To act in secret 
there must be someone who you’re trying to keep in 
the dark. But secrecy can’t demand that no one 
knows about your plans, since you do. Generally, 
conspirators act in secret in the sense that they seek 
to minimize public awareness of their plans. See 
Mandik (2007) and Dentith (2014) for more on these 
issues. 
[8] As Keeley (1999) notes, treating conspiracy 
theories as epistemically suspect by definition is 
similar to the way Hume defines miracles as running 
counter to laws of nature and hence, by definition, 
irrational to believe. 
[9] There are other reasons to prefer a neutral 
definition. Calling something a conspiracy theory 
seems to be a claim about what the theory is about, 
not about the presence or absence of evidence to 
support it. Likewise, having a neutral definition lets 
us separate the task of evaluating a theory’s 
epistemic merits from that of deciding what to call it. 
The debate about the proper definition of “conspiracy 
theory” reflects a divide in the philosophical 
literature on the subject between those who believe 
that conspiracy theories are inherently epistemically 
suspect—a.k.a. generalists—and those who think that 
each conspiracy theory should be assessed by its own 
merits—a.k.a. particularists. See Buenting, & Taylor 
(2010), Dentith (2014; 2018a), Coady (2006), Pigden 
(2006; 2016). In an effort to accommodate the 
pejorative connotation of the term, some have 
offered “conspiracism” as a label for the pathological 
tendency to believe conspiracy theories 
independently of their epistemic merits (Dentith, 
2014; 2018a). 
[10] Coady (2003), however, advocates for a definition 
that requires a contrast with an official story. For 
criticisms, see Dentith (2014) and Pigden (2007). 
[11] For example, Woodward and Bernstein’s claim—
the conspiracy theory that the Nixon administration 
was behind the Watergate break-in—initially 
contradicted the administration’s own account but 
was later accepted as the official story. It seems odd 
to say that Woodward and Bernstein’s story ceased 
to be a conspiracy theory once it was endorsed by 
officials, since none of its claims changed. So theories 
can be, or become, widely accepted yet still be 
conspiracy theories. For more on the Watergate 
scandal, see Perlstein, (2020). 
[12] This section considers how conspiracy theories 
fare against their rivals when compared according to 
certain “theoretical virtues”—i.e., criteria that 
scientists use, at least implicitly, to select the best 
theories from among available options. These 
theoretical virtues include internal consistency, 
coherence with other accepted theories, evidential 
support, simplicity, and unification, among others. 
This section addresses the last three. A theory’s 
evidential support is largely a matter of how well it 
fits the data. As for simplicity, one theory is simpler 
than another if it can explain the same data with 
fewer causes. Conversely, a theory is more unifying 
than another if it can explain more with the same 
resources. Some contend that conspiracy theories 
perform particularly badly when judged by these 
standards—e.g., Basham (2001) and Räikkä (2009). 
[13] Mandik (2007) and Clark (2002) both point to 
problems with conspiracy theorists’ appeal to 
conspirators’ mental states (e.g., beliefs, desires, 
intentions). For Mandik, this appeal, when combined 
with the claim that conspirators’ avowals are 
untrustworthy, makes it difficult for conspiracy 
theories to overcome problems associated with 
intentional explanations. Clark thinks conspiracy 
theorists are guilty of the “fundamental attribution 
error”—i.e., the human tendency to overestimate 
dispositional factors and underestimate situational 
factors in explaining the behavior of others. This 
claim, however, has been challenged by Pigden 
(2006) and Coady (2003). 
[14] Indeed, a lack of evidence for a conspiracy is 
exactly what we’d expect if there is in fact a 
conspiracy working to keep its activities a secret. 
Keeley (2003) concludes from this that 
unfalsifiability (i.e., the inability to identify a type of 
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evidence that would show the theory to be false) is 
not a good reason to reject conspiracy theories. 
Basham (2003) makes a similar claim. Keeley (2003) 
thinks that absence of evidence may be construed as 
evidence of absence only when diligent efforts to find 
evidence, efforts that have succeeded in similar cases, 
fail. 
[15] Keeley (1999) was the first to criticize conspiracy 
theories for an over-reliance on “errant data” (his 
term). 
[16] Clarke (2002) and Dentith (2019) both point this 
out in response to Keeley’s criticism regarding 
“errant data”. 
[17] Even when a conspiracy theory does explain or 
unify more data than its alternatives, this may not 
make it better. Unifying more data is only 
advantageous when the data explained is true, and 
not all data will be. So a theory that explains more 
eye-witness reports of an event like the 9/11 attacks, 
need not be better, all things considered, than its 
competitors, since eye-witness testimony is often 
compromised by the effects of unconscious bias, 
faulty memory, and the power of suggestion. This is 
one of the reasons Keeley (1999) thinks the 
preoccupation with explaining errant data 
compromises the evidential support for many 
conspiracy theories. 
[18] For a detailed account of the “Pizzagate” 
conspiracy theory, see Robb (2017). 
[19] Some suggest that just as—all else being equal—
we should avoid explaining events with many causes 
when fewer will do, we should avoid explaining 
events by appeal to malice when incompetence will 
do. This rule of thumb is sometimes called Hanlon’s 
Razor (Hanlon’s Razor, 2020)—a nod to Occam’s 
Razor, which instructs us to select, all else being 
equal, explanations with fewer causes over those 
with many. 
[20] This is Clarke’s (2002; 2007) criticism. He claims 
that conspiracy theories are “degenerating research 
programmes” in the sense developed by Lakatos 
(1970). Pigden (2006), however, questions whether 
there is genuine support for this claim. 
[21] We might liken conspiracy theorists to followers 
of millenarianism who, in the wake of a prophesied 
“Second Coming” that fails to materialize, find 
ingenious ways to reinterpret those prophecies as 
referring to some date further in the future (Barken, 
2018). 
[22] As the conspiracy expands to include the 
newspaper’s staff, it can seem less likely that one 
exists, since larger conspiracies are harder to keep 
secret and offer more opportunities for investigators 
to find evidence of their existence. This concern 
relates to other criticisms regarding how likely 
conspiracies are in general—i.e., their prior 
probability. Dentith (2014; 2016) claims that 
conspiracies, defined neutrally, are historically quite 
common. 
[23] Levy (2007) makes a claim along these lines, 
arguing that a conspiracy theory that contradicts the 
judgment of relevant “epistemic authorities” is prima 
facie unwarranted. 
In response to this claim, Dentith (2018b) observes 
that conspiracy theories often make claims that cut 
across many different disciplines. For instance, some 
versions of the “9/11 was an inside job” theory not 
only make claims that only experts in international 
politics can confirm—e.g., about the operations of 
Israeli intelligence services—but also claims that 
only civil engineers and chemists can assess—e.g., 
about the way buildings collapse and how insulated 
steel beams behave under extreme heat. 
Consequently, there are no experts or “epistemic 
authorities” on conspiracy theories per se and hence 
there is no relevant, accredited community of 
inquirers, as there is for fields like civil engineering, 
chemistry, and international politics. Aside from 
cases like 9/11 in which the government convened a 
commission of experts to investigate the attacks, 
there is no single group whose judgment can be 
appealed to when appraising a conspiracy theory. In 
the absence of such a community, conspiracy 
theorists attempt to cobble together what Dentith 
(2018b) calls “improvised expertise.” 
[24] One reason for this impasse is that trust in experts 
depends upon how likely we think conspiracies are in 
the first place, i.e., their prior probability. If they are 
quite common, then there may be good reasons not 
to trust experts, since the latter are more likely to be 
part of a conspiracy. See Basham (2001) and Dentith 
(2016). 
[25] See Expertise by Jamie Carlin Watson. 
[26] This criticism has been leveled, in different forms, 
by Keeley (1999) and Levy (2007). 
[27] This is Clarke’s (2002) response to Keeley’s 
(1999) criticism. 
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[28] This expression, which refers to the trail of 
breadcrumbs left by Hansel in the classic children’s 
fairy tale, is what proponents of the QAnon 
conspiracy theory use to describe their activities. The 
supposed government insider, Q, leaves clues or 
“breadcrumbs” in online discussion forum posts—
what are known as “Q drops”—that his followers—
self-described “bakers”—attempt to decipher. See 
Schwartz (2018) for more on the QAnon theory and 
its advocates. 
[29] We should remember that deferring to experts is 
part of what it means to “think for ourselves”. Many 
philosophers think that we are always entitled to rely 
on the testimony of experts unless there is a specific 
reason to doubt their reliability. See Watson (2018, 
October 25). 
[30] Advances in science and technology require an 
ever-increasing specialization of knowledge and 
skills that makes it difficult for any one of us to 
understand how our world works. This broad 
historical trend may explain, in part, why conspiracy 
theorizing is gaining popularity. 
There are, of course, many more reasons why people 
find conspiracy theories so compelling, including the 
thrill of solving puzzles, the desire to be among the 
“enlightened few,” and the tendency many have to 
seek out meaningful patterns among unrelated or 
random things (a.k.a. apophenia). For a game-
designer’s take on the appeal of the QAnon 
conspiracy, see Berkowitz (2020). 
[31]  Räikkä (2009) offers a helpful distinction among 
political conspiracy theories according to whether 
their claims are local (e.g., Watergate), global (e.g., 
the Iran-Contra Affair), or total (e.g., the Illuminati) in 
scope. Räikkä claims that conspiracy theories that 
aim to explain only limited historical phenomena—
i.e., local and global ones—tend to be better 
supported than total ones, which often 
posit permanent conspiracies (i.e., those that have 
been around for centuries). It’s interesting to 
consider whether the QAnon theory, which 
ostensibly only aims to explain events in US politics, 
would qualify as local according to this distinction. 
[32] For more on the rise of conspiracy theories in 
social media, including tips on how to spot them, see 
Ellis (2018). 
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